A 36-month restructuring and business plan for Storj — without reducing SNO compensation
I want Storj to survive, and I am prepared to contribute real work toward that outcome.
But survival cannot mean transferring the consequences of failed sales expansion, failed product bets, inadequate customer pricing and an unsustainable capital structure to the Storage Node Operators who still provide the infrastructure on which the product depends.
This plan therefore starts with one non-negotiable premise:
The current SNO payout schedule is the floor. There must be no reduction — direct, indirect, temporary, technical or disguised.
That includes no lower storage, egress, audit or repair rate; no unpaid traffic class; no delayed payout; no longer held amount; no lower expansion factor without compensation neutrality; and no replacement of earned payouts with an IOU, equity or a future discretionary bonus.
The numbers reach the same conclusion: a small SNO cut is financially insufficient, a large cut is operationally destructive, and abolishing payouts abolishes the service.
1. The 12-week budget is a bridge, not the plan
The filed cash budget for August 4 through October 25 shows:
| Filed 12-week cash budget | Amount |
|---|---|
| Customer billings / cash inflows | $930,634 |
| Cost of Goods Sold | $390,854 |
| Total cash outflows | $1,309,759 |
| Cash deficit before DIP financing | $379,125 |
| Budgeted DIP financing | $388,000 |
| Cash remaining at the end | $8,875 |
Docket 21 is the entered interim order, not merely a proposed order. It authorizes borrowing of up to $100,000 at the interim stage. The motion contemplates $388,000 in total, with the remaining $288,000 dependent on final relief. The DIP agreement carries 18% interest and matures twelve months after entry of the financing order.1
Even if all $388,000 becomes available, the budget consumes almost all of it. It does not fund the period after October 25, repay the DIP, deliver products or resolve prepetition liabilities.
The filings themselves identify the causes: the enterprise-sales expansion failed to generate revenue fast enough; Object Mount consumed considerable resources without gaining sufficient traction; Petagene and Valdi produced disappointing growth and minimal recurring revenue; and payroll and technology costs greatly exceeded income.1
What the budget implies after October 25
A mechanical annualization is not a forecast, but shows the scale:
| Derived annualized view | Cash inflows | Cash outflows | Gap |
|---|---|---|---|
| Full filed run-rate | $4.03M | $5.68M | $1.64M |
| After removing obvious one-offs and the filed safety margin* | $4.03M | $5.15M | $1.12M |
Removed only: final paychecks, professional fees, trustee fee and the 5% safety margin. This is still not a normalized P&L because COGS payment timing, EOR payroll and restructuring effects remain.
Storj therefore needs more than a one-time $379,125 bridge:
- enough capital to survive the transition and Chapter 11 process;
- recurring collected revenue above recurring cost;
- a product plan that creates new profitable demand;
- a confirmed treatment of debt and claims;
- and enough liquidity to repay or refinance the DIP before maturity.
Within fourteen days Storj should publish an 18-month normalized monthly model and weekly rolling 13-week cash forecast, separating collected revenue, network economics, SNO payouts, gateway/satellite cost, partner and payment fees, payroll, contractors, fixed infrastructure, Chapter 11 one-offs and legacy claims.
2. Why an SNO payout cut does not solve the problem
SNO payouts are not a dividend or an optional community benefit. They are the variable supplier cost for the storage and bandwidth Storj sells. Abolishing them would be the equivalent of a cloud provider “saving” its data-center costs by turning off the data centers.
Current public network statistics show approximately 55.274 PB of logical customer data and 76.038 PB after expansion.2 At the current $1.50 per physical TB-month storage rate, the storage component of SNO payouts is approximately $114,000 per month or $1.369 million per year. This excludes egress, audit and repair.
| Storage-rate action | Gross monthly saving | Gross annual saving | Result |
|---|---|---|---|
| 10% cut | ~$11,400 | ~$137,000 | Does not close even one eighth of the conservative $1.12M planning gap |
| 20% cut | ~$22,800 | ~$274,000 | Leaves roughly $846,000 of that gap and damages operator economics |
| 50% cut | ~$57,000 | ~$684,000 | Still leaves a major gap and makes many nodes uneconomic |
| 100% abolition | ~$114,000 | ~$1.369M | Removes the storage supplier and therefore the product |
Even under the impossible upper-bound assumption that every dollar of the filed $390,854 COGS line were reducible SNO cost, a 20% cut saves only $78,171 and leaves a $300,954 deficit; a 50% cut still leaves $183,698. Eliminating all COGS leaves only $11,729 while also eliminating the direct costs required to provide the service.
The petition separately lists approximately $4.038M owed to Inveniam, $3.742M claimed by the U.S. Treasury and $296,317 as an SNO liability: $8.076M across those three claims alone, before the DIP and its interest.1 An operator cut does not restructure those claims, create customers, finance integrations, repay the DIP or establish a cash reserve.
There is no economically useful SNO-cut range: a small cut is immaterial, a large cut destroys supply, and a 100% cut destroys the business.
The SNO Stability Covenant
Storj should incorporate the following into the restructuring plan:
| Resource | Permanent minimum |
|---|---|
| Storage | $1.50/TB-month |
| Customer egress | $2.00/TB |
| Audit and repair | $2.00/TB |
Lock the rates for at least 24 months with no automatic reduction. Any later change requires published impact and operator-concentration analysis plus six months’ notice. A lower expansion factor is acceptable only with compensation neutrality per logical customer TB.
The forum discussion is not network-wide consent. It is a voluntary sample affected by response and survivorship bias. Littleskunk expressly described his setup as deliberately efficient and warned that it should not be treated as a target.3 Operators outside the forum, those who already left and those who would quietly shut down are absent.
The limited visible reaction to the 2023 cuts does not prove another cut safe in 2026. Those measurements counted node IDs under different economics and placement. Node count does not reveal independent operators, used-data concentration, geographic value or repair load. Storj also stated that the present rates were believed sustainable and that further changes were not anticipated for the foreseeable future.4
In my operation, electricity, servers, network and IP costs alone consume about 58–60% of average payout, excluding hardware replacement, capital recovery, maintenance, labour, taxes and risk. Several contracts cannot be cancelled after a cut.
Large operators can leave with large amounts of used data and large absolute costs. Small operators may stop replacing failed drives because the remaining return no longer justifies their time. Both can happen together. A broad cut cannot selectively remove only unused capacity.
Storj should therefore publish anonymized concentration by the largest 10, 25 and 50 independent operators, country, ASN and /24, together with simulated repair volume and repair cost if the largest operators leave simultaneously.
3. Correct the customer price, not the infrastructure price
The filed budget needs 40.74% more cash inflow merely to cover twelve-week outflows with zero churn, leaving no reserve or product budget. The immediate target should therefore be a 70% increase in weighted collected unit revenue with 24-month price stability.
Proposed prices
| Plan | Storage | Egress | Commitment |
|---|---|---|---|
| Standard Self-Service | $12/TB-month | $12/TB | $5 minimum, fully credited against use |
| Advanced / Select | $17/TB-month | $12/TB | $250 monthly committed spend, fully credited |
| Enterprise Committed | floor $10/TB-month | floor $8/TB | 12-month take-or-pay, minimum $5,000/month and minimum 60% gross margin |
New customers move immediately; month-to-month customers receive 30 days’ notice; fixed contracts move at the earliest lawful repricing or renewal. Standard gets direct credit-card checkout, and no contract is approved below documented fully loaded direct cost and margin floors.
The current public pricing is $7/$7 for Standard and $10/$7 for Advanced. The public page also presents a $5 Object Storage minimum while stale Object Mount text still refers to a $50 minimum, and Standard is still routed through “Contact sales.” These contradictions must be corrected immediately.5
The failed $50-minimum rollout is also a warning: Storj later reverted it to $5 and acknowledged that customers had already left.6 The answer is not another improvised price change. It is one comprehensible structure, proper notice and a 24-month lock.
Optional simple bundles can remove the fear of metered billing. Storage is listed first; every bundle includes automatic provisioning, the relevant Storj Connect integration and Standard overage:
- Developer Connect — $9/month: 250 GB + 100 GB egress.
- WordPress Connect — $15/month: 500 GB + 250 GB egress; media and backups.
- Personal Cloud Connect — $19/month: 1 TB + 250 GB egress; Nextcloud/ownCloud.
- Media Connect — $29/month: 1 TB + 1 TB egress; Plex/Jellyfin/Emby.
- NAS Connect — $39/month: 2 TB + 500 GB egress; Synology/QNAP/TrueNAS/Unraid.
- AI Data Workspace — $49/month: 2 TB + 1 TB egress; datasets, checkpoints and models.
- Server Backup Connect — $79/month: 5 TB + 500 GB egress; Proxmox/Restic/Borg/Velero.
- Hosting & Agency Connect — $109/month: 5 TB + 2 TB egress; cPanel/Plesk/multi-site WordPress.
- MSP & Business Continuity — $219/month: 10 TB + 5 TB egress; multi-customer backup and disaster recovery.
Churn stress test
Exact churn cannot be predicted without customer-level contract, usage and margin data. The defensible approach is a sensitivity test assuming a 70% weighted price increase, no new sales and the filed $1,309,759 outflows.
| Weighted usage loss | New 12-week billings | Result with no cost relief | Result if 50% of COGS varies with usage |
|---|---|---|---|
| 0% | $1,582,078 | +$272,319 | +$272,319 |
| 10% | $1,423,870 | +$114,111 | +$133,654 |
| 15% | $1,344,766 | +$35,007 | +$64,321 |
| 20% | $1,265,662 | -$44,097 | -$5,011 |
| 25% | $1,186,558 | -$123,201 | -$74,344 |
The reset covers filed outflows with 17.21% weighted usage loss even if no cost falls, 19.64% if half of COGS varies, and 22.86% if all COGS varies. Plan for 10% base, 15% downside and 20% stress; above 20% triggers corrective action and capital—never an SNO cut.
Account churn and usage churn differ: many tiny accounts may leave while representing little data or revenue, whereas large customers face migration and contract friction but greater Chapter 11 trust risk. Within fourteen days Storj must replace these assumptions with a material-customer cohort table covering revenue, usage, term, direct COGS, proposed price, renewal and churn owner.
A price increase can temporarily reduce absolute SNO payouts as customers delete data, but that is not a unit-rate cut. A 10% storage loss reduces payout volume about $11,400/month, while a 70% reset with 10% usage loss raises the filed collection equivalent from about $336,000 to $514,000/month. Released capacity remains available and growth restores payout volume.
Customer deletion releases capacity. Operator departure forces repair and migration of customer data. The first corrects demand; the second damages supply.
Competitive position
Illustrative U.S./European list rates vary by region, requests and contract:
| Provider | Hot storage/TB-month | Internet egress/TB | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| Proposed Storj Standard | $12 | $12 | Simple price, no general request fee |
| Proposed Storj Advanced | $17 | $12 | Compliance-controlled placement |
| AWS S3 Standard | ~$26 | ~$90 | Request and feature charges |
| Azure Hot Blob | ~$20 | ~$87 | Transaction charges; region/redundancy vary |
| Backblaze B2 | $6.95 | free to 3× storage, then $10 | Strong low-cost competitor |
| Cloudflare R2 | $15 | free | Class A/B operation charges |
Storj remains substantially cheaper than AWS and Azure.7 It will not beat B2 or R2 on every workload, so it must win on distribution, durability, security, predictable billing, performance, migration and radically easier integration—not a race to the bottom.
4. The 36-month operating plan
The filed billings equal approximately $336,000 per month. A 70% price reset with 10% weighted usage loss produces approximately $514,000 collected monthly revenue before any new customer growth.
The operating model should cap recurring fixed cash cost — payroll, contractors, ordinary administration, subscriptions and non-variable infrastructure, excluding direct COGS and Chapter 11 one-offs — at $300,000/month during Year 1. With direct COGS capped at 40% of collected revenue, cash break-even is:
$300,000 / (1 - 40%) = $500,000 collected MRR
Required targets — not forecasts
| Target period | Collected MRR / average | Direct COGS cap | Fixed cash cap | Operating cash before restructuring and debt service |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Day 30 | ≥$500,000 run-rate | 40% | $300k/month | break-even run-rate |
| Month 3 | ≥$550,000 | 40% | $300k/month | positive |
| Month 6 | ≥$650,000 | 40% | $300k/month | ≥$90k/month |
| Year 1 | $600k average / $800k exit | 40% | $3.6M/year | ≥$720k/year |
| Year 2 | $950k average / $1.1M exit | 36% | $4.08M/year | ≥$3.22M/year |
| Year 3 | $1.30M average / $1.50M exit | 33% | $4.8M/year | ≥$5.65M/year |
Management must replace these targets with actual cohort and COGS data; growth spending expands only after collected gross profit pays for it.
Liquidity policy:
- at emergence: at least six months of fixed cash cost;
- end of Year 2: at least nine months;
- end of Year 3: at least twelve months;
- no distribution, buyback or speculative product investment before those reserves exist;
- refinance, convert or repay the DIP well before its twelve-month maturity.
Exit financing: minimum $4M, target $5M
The $388,000 DIP is too small and too expensive to fund a turnaround. Storj should raise equity, preferred equity or a deeply subordinated convertible instrument — not another short 18% operating loan.
| Proposed $5M use of funds | Amount |
|---|---|
| 12-month operating and transition reserve | $1.20M |
| Storj Connect, integrations, security and QA | $0.80M |
| Customer migration, channel launch and paid pilots | $0.50M |
| Chapter 11, legal, tax and plan implementation | $0.50M |
| Reserve for the filed SNO liability pending validation | $0.30M |
| DIP principal plus maximum indicative one-year interest | $0.46M |
| Minimum unrestricted liquidity reserve | $0.75M |
| Contingency | $0.49M |
| Total | $5.00M |
This capital is not permission to preserve the old burn rate. Release it in milestones tied to price migration, cost caps, product delivery and collected MRR.
The restructuring should seek conversion of the Inveniam prepetition claim into equity, preferred equity or long-term subordinated debt; lawful court-approved treatment of the Treasury claim; full disclosure of the $296,317 SNO liability; on-time payment of all postpetition SNO obligations at current rates; and a funded objective to pay valid prepetition SNO claims in full under the confirmed plan.
Inveniam is listed as a 10%+ equity owner, the largest unsecured creditor and the DIP lender, and the DIP agreement includes credit-bid rights.1 That is not proof of wrongdoing, but it requires an independent restructuring committee, independent valuation and a genuine market check for any asset sale, credit bid, debt conversion or change of control.
5. Build the missing product: Storj Connect
Storj does not primarily have a protocol problem. It has a productization and onboarding problem.
S3 compatibility is valuable because many applications already speak that interface. But S3 is a compatibility layer, not a customer journey. A WordPress operator should not need to understand buckets, access keys, endpoints, regions, path-style access or Signature V4. A Plex user should not need to learn Rclone, VFS cache flags and mount services.
Storj’s own guides currently require exactly those manual steps for WordPress, Plex, QNAP, TrueNAS and other tools.8 Direct integrations are therefore not an alternative to S3. They can use S3 invisibly underneath, or native Uplink when client-side encryption or download performance makes that preferable. The customer should only click Connect Storj.
Architecture
WordPress / Plex / NAS / backup / AI tool
|
Storj login or device code
|
Storj Connect Control Plane
project + bucket + scoped access + policy
billing + migration + health + revocation
/ \
S3-compatible adapter Native Uplink
\ /
Storj network
Control Plane MVP
The first two weeks should define one integration manifest and stable APIs:
POST /v1/integrations create and bind an app
POST /v1/projects provision a project
POST /v1/buckets provision policy and lifecycle
POST /v1/credentials issue scoped credentials
POST /v1/credentials/rotate rotate or revoke access
POST /v1/migrations start/resume/rollback migration
GET /v1/health integration diagnostics
GET /v1/billing-estimates current use and projected bill
The manifest defines permissions, bucket/prefix, cache, retention, migration, health tests and bundle. The platform needs device-code/OAuth login, scoped credentials, rotation, revocation, audit logs, sandbox, webhooks, CLI, Terraform and generated SDKs for TypeScript, PHP, Python, Go, Java and .NET.
Storj Bridge
A small open-source local agent for Windows, macOS, Linux, Docker and common NAS platforms should provide:
- FUSE/WinFsp filesystem access and optional SMB/WebDAV;
- read-through/write-back cache, range reads and sequential prefetch;
- resumable multipart upload, upload watching and offline pinning;
- local metadata cache so media scanners do not repeatedly list entire buckets;
- bandwidth schedules, health checks, logs and one-click support bundles;
- signed automatic updates.
Reuse useful Object Mount technology as a customer-acquisition component, not another speculative standalone product and sales motion.
Named 90-day team
Team: one empowered product owner, two platform/systems engineers, one WordPress/PHP engineer, one frontend/UX engineer, one DevOps/security engineer and one QA/compatibility lead. Roles may be combined, but every release needs one accountable owner.
6. Products that can create demand immediately
Official WordPress plugin — Storj Media & Backup
User flow: install plugin → click Connect with Storj → choose Media, Backups or Both → start migration.
It must automatically provision the account resources, offload new media, bulk-migrate existing media with resumable jobs, rewrite URLs, support a custom domain/CDN, retain a reversible local-copy option, restore to local storage, support Multisite/WooCommerce/page builders, back up files and database, estimate the bill and diagnose failures.
Private alpha in 30 days, public beta in 45 days, production in 90 days. My own earlier customer experience showed the problem clearly: a conventional CDN integrated in an afternoon, while Storj would have required rebuilding the media pipeline over weeks. Price was not the deciding factor; integration friction was.9
Plex, Jellyfin and Emby profile
User flow: install Docker/Unraid/NAS package → enter device code → choose cache folder and media library → point the media server at the mounted folder.
The profile needs metadata caching, range-read optimization, sequential read-ahead, configurable SSD cache, offline pinning, scan throttling, upload watching and migration from local disk or another object store. Alpha by Day 45; public beta by Day 90.
NAS, backup and hosting
Turn existing guides into one-click packages for Synology, QNAP, TrueNAS, Unraid, Proxmox, Nextcloud, cPanel, Plesk, Restic, Rclone, Velero and MSP backup products. Technical compatibility is not a finished customer journey.
Storj AI Data Plane
Do not build another capital-intensive standalone GPU company. Build a Bring Your Own Data / Model / Compute data plane for customer-owned or partner compute.
One click should create a dataset/model workspace, bucket, scoped access, lifecycle policy, local cache and generated Docker Compose or Kubernetes configuration. Initial templates:
- Hugging Face datasets;
- MLflow artifacts and model registry;
- DVC datasets;
- PyTorch/TensorFlow checkpoints;
- Ollama, llama.cpp and vLLM model caches;
- versioned dataset snapshots and experiment outputs.
Storj already documents Hugging Face through S3FS, and MLflow and vLLM support S3-compatible object stores.10 The missing product is automatic provisioning and an idiot-proof workflow.
Any offer advertised as “zero egress to compute” must be funded by compute or partner revenue sufficient to pay the full current SNO egress rate. A customer promotion cannot become unpaid operator traffic.
7. Product-led distribution and strict commercial rules
The court filing says the enterprise-sales expansion failed to generate revenue fast enough. The answer is not another broad sales hiring cycle. Distribution should come through the product:
- WordPress plugin directory;
- Docker Hub and GitHub Container Registry;
- Unraid and NAS app stores;
- cPanel/Plesk and backup marketplaces;
- MSPs, WordPress agencies and hosting providers;
- AI/MLOps templates and compute partners.
Commercial rules:
- Standard is fully self-service; sales handles Advanced, migrations and committed enterprise contracts.
- Partner commission is based on collected gross profit or 5% of collected revenue for the first twelve months, not announced ARR.
- Sales compensation is based on collected gross profit and retention.
- No substantial custom engineering without a paid pilot, named buyer, conversion deadline and margin model.
- No new product line without a prepaid design partner.
- Every customer cohort receives a monthly contribution-margin report.
- Negative-margin custom contracts are repriced, redesigned or discontinued.
During Chapter 11 Storj should publish weekly aggregated actual-versus-budget collections, categorized COGS, SNO obligations due and paid, unrestricted cash, DIP availability, fixed-cost run-rate, price migration, weighted usage churn, new collected MRR and exit-financing status; monthly reporting continues after emergence.
8. Execution schedule and failure triggers
Days 0–7
Publish the SNO Stability Covenant; confirm postpetition payout dates; disclose COGS and the SNO-liability breakdown; correct Docket 21 status and current DIP availability; announce the new prices and 24-month lock; remove contradictory website pricing; appoint the turnaround owner and Storj Connect product owner; begin the $5M exit-capital process.
Days 8–30
Activate new-customer pricing; issue proper notice to existing self-service customers; finish the contract/cohort audit; launch direct Standard checkout; publish the normalized 18-month model; release Control Plane alpha, public API specification and WordPress private alpha; reach at least $500k collected MRR run-rate.
Days 31–90
Release WordPress public beta, Storj Bridge alpha, media-server beta and initial AI templates; sign at least ten paying design partners; complete eligible price migration; hold COGS at or below 40% and fixed cash at or below $300k/month; reach $550k collected MRR; sign binding exit-financing and restructuring terms.
Months 4–6
Ship production WordPress and Bridge releases; add NAS, hosting and backup packages; launch the integration marketplace; reach $650k collected MRR and positive recurring cash flow; file or become ready to file a confirmable Chapter 11 plan; refinance or convert the DIP.
Months 7–12
Reach $800k collected MRR; emerge with at least six months of fixed-cost liquidity; complete court-approved treatment of valid SNO claims; maintain current SNO rates and on-time payment.
Years 2–3
Reach $1.1M exit MRR in Year 2 and $1.5M in Year 3; expand integrations and partner distribution only from collected gross profit; build nine then twelve months of liquidity; repay or refinance remaining restructuring obligations without using SNO compensation as the balancing item.
Mandatory failure triggers
- More than 20% weighted usage loss: use the churn reserve, reprice negative-margin contracts, reduce fixed cost and accelerate acquisition — no SNO cut.
- No $500k run-rate or credible financing path by Day 60: freeze all non-core development and begin a formal strategic-options process.
- No $550k collected MRR and no binding exit-financing/restructuring terms by Day 90: start an orderly competitive sale or transfer while cash and customer trust remain.
- No positive recurring cash flow by Month 6: proceed with the strategic transaction rather than another emergency loan cycle.
Any sale must protect customer data, postpetition payments, current SNO rates and independent review. Waiting until cash is exhausted destroys leverage and network value.
9. My concrete contribution — and the conditions required for it
I have founded and built several companies. A serious turnaround requires the real financial, operational, customer and technical data—not only public fragments. If Storj provides it, under an NDA where necessary, I am prepared to help turn this proposal into an executable restructuring and business plan.
I also have several programmers available and will donate development work worth a five-figure amount for Storj Connect, WordPress, Bridge, APIs/SDKs, tests, migration tools or another agreed priority. This requires a named product owner, acceptance criteria, sandbox/API access, reviews and a real release path.
Conditions
- Current SNO compensation remains unchanged in nominal and effective terms.
- Existing professional multi-node deployments are not retroactively penalized or traffic-suppressed solely for using multiple ISP ranges, routed subnets, VPS endpoints or operator-managed VPNs.
This is not a request to ignore correlation risk or receive preferential treatment. Existing disclosed deployments need a formal grandfathering and approval path, followed by prospective rules based on measured failure domains, uptime, audits, bandwidth, latency, geographic and ASN concentration, and actual repair impact—not labels such as “large farm,” “VPS” or “VPN.” Qualifying deployments should be explicitly permitted to continue; materially different future rules require notice, impact analysis and a practical migration period.
Failure-domain illustration
Public forum data showed approximately 12,844 visible /24 blocks. Assume three professional operators each run 1,000 nodes across 1,000 /24s, evenly split among three independent host and storage failure domains.
If one host domain at each operator failed simultaneously, about 1,000 /24s—or 7.8% of the visible pool—would be affected. With 49 pieces and 29 required for reconstruction, a uniformly distributed segment would lose about 3.8 pieces on average and retain about 45. It must lose at least 21 pieces to become unrecoverable; under this simplified uniform model, the probability in the described outage is approximately 2 × 10⁻¹¹ per segment.
The outage could trigger repair traffic and is not cost-free, but repair is not data loss and does not justify excluding professional farms or VPS/VPN-assisted deployments indiscriminately. A complete operator-wide outage is different and should be tested with Storj’s actual placement-weighted operator, host, subnet and ASN data—not inferred from connection type.
Real correlated failure domains should be managed through targeted controls, disclosure and agreed transitions, not opaque blanket filters based on size or architecture.
My contribution can create customers and reduce development cost. I will not donate it while accepting lower SNO compensation or policies that devalue or exclude the infrastructure on which my contribution and existing investment depend.
Conclusion
Storj’s connected problems are inadequate customer economics, integration friction, unfocused product and sales spending, insufficient liquidity, an unsustainable capital structure and damaged trust. An SNO cut solves none of them.
Price the product sustainably + make Storj radically easier to use + turn integrations into distribution + cap recurring costs + restructure debt + fund sufficient runway + protect the SNO infrastructure.
Storj can remain far cheaper than AWS and Azure, hide S3 complexity behind direct integrations, and turn existing guides into products for WordPress, media, NAS, backup, hosting and self-hosted AI. It can emerge from Chapter 11 with positive recurring cash flow and adequate liquidity.
It cannot repair pricing, product, sales and capital-structure failures by repeatedly lowering payment to the infrastructure that still works.
Not one cent of this plan requires a reduction in the current SNO rates.
Sources
1 Court · 2 Stats · 3 Operators · 4a Rates / 4 2023 · 5 Pricing · 6 Reversal · 7 AWS / 7b Azure / 7c B2 / 7d R2 · 8 WordPress / 8b Plex / 8c QNAP / 8d Rclone · 9 Example · 10 Hugging Face / 10b MLflow / 10c vLLM
